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INTRODUCTION 
Costa Rica is known globally for its impressive record of 
establishing national parks and other types of protected spaces. 
Largely since the 1970s, that country has developed an impressive 
system of protected areas, which now covers approximately 28% of 
the national territory. These areas are diverse in nature, ranging from 
national parks, biological reserves, national monuments, natural 
reserves, wildlife refuges, and indigenous reserves that are more 
strictly protected, to forest reserves and protected zones that are 
managed to allow greater economic-driven activities, such as wood 
extraction (Evans, 1999, pp. 7-9). The first major step taken by the 
Costa Rican government in developing this system was its passage 
of the Forest Law of 1969, which called for the establishment of 
protected areas (Asamblea Legislativa, 1969). 
In many other instances, however, Costa Rica has had significant 
difficulties in carrying out its progressive environmental statutes and 
regulations. In fact, environmental movement leader Alvaro Ugalde 
described his country as a leader in three things: conservation, 
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deforestation (understood as the clearing of forests), and pollution of 
river systems (A. Ugalde, personal interview, April 19, 2002). 
Indeed, while a new and improved Forest Law of 1996 intends to 
better protect forests outside of protected areas, major forest loss is 
still occurring in several areas of the country. 
This chapter examines the causes of the disappearance of a 
substantial amount of forest in Costa Rica’s Área de Conservación 
La Amistad-Caribe (ACLAC) (Amistad-Caribe Conservation Area). 
The ACLAC is one region within a system of “conservation areas” 
into which the entire territory has been divided, encompassing 
roughly the southeastern corner of Costa Rica, running north more 
than halfway up the Caribbean coast and south to the border with 
Panama, and extending inland to the Talamanca Cordillera. (See 
Maps 9.1 and 9.2.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 9.1 Location of the ACLAC within Costa Rica’s National 
System of Conservation Areas 
Source: Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC) (2002) 
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Costa Rica is widely regarded as providing a “model” for the 
developing world on how to design and execute a system of 
protected areas. This chapter helps to explain why that country has 
not been able to provide a better example of how to control forest 
loss outside of such protected spaces. Answering this question points 
toward what policies might best address this problem, setting the 
Map 9.2 Map of Costa Rica with Political Boundaries and Topography 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas (2005)
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country on a course to once again provide a model for other 
developing countries. As I will explain, however, determining and 
carrying out these policy reforms will be difficult, as the 
disappearance of forest in the ACLAC originates in well-embedded 
conditions: legal loopholes, poverty, insecure land tenure, corruption, 
budgetary deficiencies, and ineffective judicial procedures. 
Before describing the causes of heavy loss of forest in the 
ACLAC and possible policy remedies, I will briefly describe the 
methodology, relevant content of the Forest Law of 1996, and the 
extent and consequences of the forest degradation taking place in 
this area of the country. 
METHODOLOGY 
The following examination of why substantial deforestation and 
thinning are taking place in the ACLAC is based upon qualitative data 
collected during field research in the region in 2002. I interviewed 
persons very knowledgeable about the subject, based on their direct 
involvement in or active observation of the local implementation of 
the Forest Law of 1996. Because the interviews were intensive, 
discussions with six such persons provided a large quantity of data. 
Additionally, interviewing six persons allowed me to gain 
perspectives from various institutions, including government, local 
indigenous organizations, and local environmental nongovernmental 
organizations. 
Also indicating the utility of carrying out six interviews, by the 
last interview much information was being repeated, making 
identification of key causal factors clear. Basically, I asked 
informants to identify key actors in the deforestation or heavy 
thinning of forests in the ACLAC, the nature of their behavior, and 
important characteristics of the broader political, economic, and 
social context. To foster open discussion of controversial subjects, 
such as corruption, these interviewees remain anonymous. 
KEY PROVISIONS OF THE FOREST LAW OF 1996 
In the ACLAC, substantial forest loss has taken place despite 
efforts to check it through invoking the Forest Law of 1996. This law 
is truly a “sustainable development” policy, as it is aimed not only at 
protecting the forests, but also fostering economic growth through 
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support to the forestry sector, social equity through support to 
campesinos (peasants) involved in forestry, and democracy by 
creating inclusive policymaking bodies. 
Several provisions of this law are most relevant to the goal of 
protecting forests. For the first time in Costa Rica, Article 19 banned 
clear-cutting in forests, even for the establishment of forest 
plantations. However, a loophole in this prohibition is its definition 
of “forests.” This definition, laid out in Article 3(d), is highly 
complicated as well as subjective. It requires that trees cover an area 
of two or more hectares, be mature but of varying ages, be of varying 
species, have one or more canopies that cover more than 70% of the 
area, and contain more than sixty trees of fifteen or more centimeters 
in diameter per hectare (Asamblea Legislativa, 1996, pp. 3883, 
3898). Problematically for the goal of environmental protection, 
clear-cutting is possible where public authorities determine that a 
particular area does not fall within this definition of forests. 
In the case of areas determined to, indeed, be forest, Article 20 
explains that logging will be controlled through a permit called a 
“management plan.” In addition to the ban on clear-cutting, 
regulations implementing the Forest Law of 1996 dictate the 
necessary components of a management plan. For instance, 
explained one interviewee, a management plan must assure that 
mature trees are left for seeding, trees that are scarce in the area are 
not extracted, and at least 40 percent of each commercial tree species 
is left in place. Outside of forests, a management plan is not 
required. 
Article 28 explains that forest plantations as well as 
“agroforestry systems and trees planted individually” do not require 
a permit for logging, or for transporting, industrializing, and 
exporting the wood (Asamblea Legislativa, 1996, pp. 3899, 3905). 
While agroforestry basically entails the cultivation of crops among 
trees that might also be harvested, the meaning of “trees planted 
individually” is much less clear. In practice, Article 28 has been 
interpreted to broadly exempt areas outside of forests from obtaining 
the otherwise-required permits. On such lands, only a “forest 
inventory” must be completed before logging can take place. An 
interviewee described the forest inventory as simply a declaration of 
the basic profile of the trees in an area, such as how many trees there 
are, the species present, and diameter and height of the trees. After 
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this document has been developed by a public official, often that 
official allows extensive logging, and sometime clear-cutting, to take 
place. 
Determining whether an area is a forest is left to two different 
regulators. Article 21 explains that “forest regents” will be 
responsible for designing management plans and monitoring their 
execution. Although not government employees, these professionals 
in forestry are granted “public faith” to carry out these functions. In 
practice, this regulator first determines whether the area to be logged 
is a forest as defined by the Forest Law of 1996. If yes, the forest 
regent develops a management plan; if not, the forest regent 
compiles a forest inventory and has greater discretion in determining 
the amount of logging to be allowed. 
As declared in Articles 6(b) and (c), it is still necessary for the 
Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (MINAE) (Ministry of 
Environment and Energy) to approve management plans and help 
monitor their execution (Asamblea Legislativa, 1996, pp. 3886, 
3900). The Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (SINAC) 
(National System of Conservation Areas), which forms a part of 
MINAE, does the legwork. SINAC is the system of conservation 
regions into which the Costa Rican territory is divided, of which the 
ACLAC is one regional division. Within the ACLAC, officials at the 
regional and sub-regional offices approve and oversee the use of 
management plans. 
The Forest Law of 1996 also regulates the transport and 
processing of wood. As described above, Article 28 declares that no 
permits are necessary for transporting and industrializing wood 
originating from forest plantations, agroforestry systems, and other 
areas outside of forests. In contrast, Article 56 declares that logs and 
boards originating from forests cannot be transported without proper 
documentation. More specific requirements for this manifest are 
dictated through implementing regulations. Article 55 further 
declares that anyone possessing logs or boards, including wood 
processors (e.g., sawmills and furniture manufacturers), must be able 
to show an associated logging permit. Of course, if logs or boards 
originated in areas outside of forests, then the processor will have no 
management plan to show authorities. To enforce these 
requirements, Article 6(g) calls upon MINAE to carry out 
inspections of wood being transported as well as processed 
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(Asamblea Legislativa, 1996, pp. 3887, 3927-3928). Once again, 
these responsibilities have been carried out by functionaries at the 
ACLAC regional and sub-regional offices. The police also assist in 
inspecting wood transporters. 
MAJOR FOREST LOSS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
In spite of these provisions in the Forest Law of 1996, serious 
forest loss is taking place in several areas of Costa Rica. To be sure, 
the overall deforestation rate in Costa Rica has decreased. A study 
by the Centro Científico Tropical (CCT) (Tropical Science Center) 
and the University of Costa Rica estimated that on average 12,000 
hectares of forest were lost per year between 1987 and 1997. A 
follow-up analysis by the CCT and the University of Alberta 
estimated that, on average between 1997 and 2000, this rate had 
gone down to 3,000 hectares annually (Laboratorio de Sistemas de 
Observación Terrestre [EOSL] & Centro Científico Tropical [CCT], 
2002, p. 9). Environmental movement leader Alvaro Ugalde named 
several factors that have been most important in producing this 
reduction: the fact that not much forest is left in Costa Rica, the 
shrinkage of the country’s cattle industry, economic incentives for 
the protection of forests established through the Forest Law of 1996, 
and an increase in the number of private forest reserves (A. Ugalde, 
personal interview, April 19, 2002). 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by satellite observation, large 
areas of forest are disappearing on the Osa Peninsula in the 
southwest of the country, in the Northern Zone, and in the Atlantic 
Zone, which includes the ACLAC (Centro Científico Tropical [CCT] 
& Centro de Investigaciones en Desarrollo Sostenible [CIEDES], 
1998, pp. 12, 18; EOSL & CCT, 2002, p. 9). The problem on the Osa 
Peninsula has received the most attention in recent years, probably 
because the area harbors great biodiversity. For instance, one study 
found that mature forests on the Osa Peninsula contain the third 
highest species richness of 89 areas analyzed throughout the 
“Neotropics,” which encompass Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Barrantes et al., 1999, p. 1). 
The lands included within the ACLAC also contain a high level 
of biodiversity. In fact, because of the scenic beauty and scientific 
value of this biological diversity, La Amistad National Park, located 
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in the region, was declared a World Heritage Site. Interviewees 
explained that deforestation or other serious degradation of forests is 
occurring at many different sites within this region. However, this 
environmental damage is concentrated along a forest frontier inland 
from the Caribbean coast but not yet reaching the higher elevations 
of the Talamanca Cordillera. Recently, MINAE identified such loss 
of forests as the greatest threat to forest biodiversity in Costa Rica 
(Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía [MINAE] and Programa de las 
Naciones Unidas para el Medio Ambiente [PNUMA], 2002, p. 28). 
Additionally, this process has negatively impacted rural 
communities in the ACLAC. For instance, some logging in this 
region is taking place illegally in aquifer recharge areas, threatening 
the supply of drinking water (Jiménez, 2002, p. 16A). Furthermore, 
an interviewee explained that excessive logging is exacerbating 
problems caused by banana plantations. Forests near rivers and 
streams that helped to slow the flow of rainwater into these 
waterways have been removed. With less buffer, water circulated 
through banana plantations by their many canals is more quickly 
reaching waterways, causing them to overflow into nearby 
communities 
Thus, substantial loss of forests in the ACLAC presents serious 
threats not only to local species and ecosystems, but also to the 
communities that rely upon these natural systems. The causes of this 
forest loss are explored below. 
BEHIND THE DEFORESTATION AND HEAVY LOGGING 
The interviewing revealed that the greatest damage to forests in 
the ACLAC is taking place on the land of campesinos, or peasants. 
Generally in Costa Rica, campesinos with land dedicate between 30 
and 40% of their plot to subsistence farming (principally the 
cultivation of beans and corn), another 30 to 40% to commercial 
farming (principally the cultivation of coffee), and the rest to 
pasture. Additionally, some engage in forestry (Watson et al., 1998, 
p. 22). 
However, as Seligson (1980) points out, Costa Rica’s peasantry 
is diverse, including landholders and persons without land: 
landowners with title, landowners without title, squatters, renters, 
sharecroppers, steady nonplantation laborers, steady plantation 
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laborers, day laborers, and migrant workers. The titled landowners 
are the “elite” among peasants, as they have control over means of 
production, tenure security, and, although much poorer than most 
urban Costa Ricans, are significantly better off than the rest of the 
peasantry. 
Nevertheless, the great majority of these landowners with title 
are smallholders. Specifically, Seligson (1980) found that 53% of 
titled landowners in Costa Rica hold less than 4 hectares of land, and 
81% hold less than 10 hectares. Among landowners not holding title, 
he found that bills of sale that had not been notarized were the most 
frequently possessed proof of ownership. Other landowners without 
a title had no such proof of ownership (pp. 88-91). 
Indigenous groups also live in rural sections of the ACLAC. In 
fact, the Talamanca Cordillera is the home of the majority of Costa 
Rica’s indigenous population. But in contrast to campesinos, 
informants agreed that indigenous communities are not significantly 
degrading forests. Typically indigenous peoples have cleared only 
small areas for subsistence agriculture and grazing.1 
Campesinos and Poverty 
Key in leading peasants in this region to cut trees on their land is 
the fact that many live in poverty. Needing money in the short-term 
to meet basic needs and having limited options for obtaining such 
funds, campesino families often resort to felling trees to produce 
wood for sale and open land for crops and grazing. One interviewee 
explained that a cause of increased poverty along the Caribbean 
coast was the devastation of the region’s cacao crop by a disease in 
the 1980s.2 Cahuita and Puerto Viejo on the southern coast suffered 
less because of budding tourism. But in other areas where cacao 
cultivation had played a major economic role, more people resorted 
to selling the trees on their land or even selling their land to banana 
companies. Some campesinos attempted to switch to banana 
cultivation but were often unable to compete with the prices offered 
by larger banana companies. More recently, banana production has 
decreased in the ACLAC. As a result, more people in the region are 
unemployed and likely to fell trees for quick revenue as well as 
opening space for subsistence farming and ranching.3 
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Rural poverty on the eastern side of the Talamanca Cordillera 
cannot be adequately understood, however, without the longer 
history of banana cultivation, exploitation, and discrimination. Until 
the late nineteenth century, the province of Limón was inhabited 
only by Native American groups. Because coffee, Costa Rica’s chief 
export, was grown on the eastern slope of the cordillera that runs 
roughly down the center of the country, it made sense to develop a 
port on the Caribbean coast and land transportation connecting to the 
coffee plantations. 
In 1871, the Costa Rican national government agreed to a 
contract with North American Henry Meiggs for the development of 
a railroad, which was later executed by his nephew Minor Keith. 
Laying the groundwork for current economic and social conditions 
in the region, Keith not only developed the railroad and a port in the 
town of Limón, but also acquired land from the Costa Rican 
government that he utilized to build a local economy based on large-
scale banana cultivation. Construction and operation relied heavily 
upon migrant labor from the West Indies (Purcell, 1993, pp. 23, 25, 
29). 
As Seligson (1980) explained, the local banana industry came to 
form an “enclave economy”: 
The means of production were almost totally in the hands of the United 
Fruit Company: the plantations, roads, railroads, docks, and ships were 
either owned by, or on 99-year lease to, the Company. Plantations 
which were not owned by the Company were effectively controlled by 
it through its monopoly on transportation and exportation. (p. 57) 
Further consolidating its power, Keith’s United Fruit Company 
used various tactics to exploit its workers. For instance, it paid 
Anglos more than non-Anglos. It suppressed organized opposition 
by importing labor from different Caribbean islands. It encouraged 
divisions between Black and Hispanic laborers by using strike 
breakers of one group to respond to strikes initiated by the other 
(Purcell, 1993, pp. 30, 32). It also deported foreigners for union 
organizing or participating in strikes (Bourgois, 1989, p. 215). Also 
discouraging economic development in the region, each time the 
company ceased production on infected or exhausted soils, it 
systematically destroyed the infrastructure it had constructed 
(railroads, bridges, telephone lines, etc.) to prevent competitors from 
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being able to renew production on a smaller scale (Bourgois, 1989, 
p. 8). 
The Costa Rican government did not confront the United Fruit 
Company over such practices because “a conflict with the ‘Frutera’ 
meant a confrontation with the economic, political, and ultimately 
military power of the United States--a confrontation which Costa 
Rica was guaranteed to lose” (Seligson, 1980, p. 58). Furthermore, 
that company has historically had subsidiaries producing and 
purchasing bananas in several countries simultaneously, enabling it 
to pressure governments by threatening to relocate unless it is 
granted lower taxes and allowed to repress labor (Bourgois, 1989, 
pp. 19-20). 
The precarious nature of this enclave economy was exhibited 
with the decline of banana cultivation early in the twentieth century, 
caused by leaf spot diseases, government and public opposition to 
the United Fruit Company’s discrimination that favored West 
Indians over Hispanics, and soil exhaustion. The company 
eventually relocated to Costa Rica’s Pacific coast. Because Blacks 
were prohibited from moving west beyond the town of Turrialba, 
many in the province of Limón were left in povery from which they 
could not escape. In addition to paying wages, the United Fruit 
Company had provided for basic needs such as housing and health 
care (Purcell, 1993, pp. 28, 41, 43, 44). It was two decades before 
the Standard Fruit Company reinitiated large-scale banana 
production in the region in 1956, when a disease-resistant variety of 
banana was created (Seligson, 1980, p. 76). 
This history of dependence and exploitation of the people and 
land explains why, even though Limón is once again the site of 
major banana cultivation and includes Costa Rica’s main 
commercial port, it remains poor and sparsely populated. Bourgois 
(1989) provides a vivid description of the substandard living 
conditions found in a community near the Panamanian border which 
relies on banana cultivation: 
 On the Costa Rican side of the border, where I spent most of my 
time, the stores and restaurants consisted of shanty stalls stretching 
single file along the muddy road paralleling the railroad that lead to the 
Panamanian border crossing at the Sixaola Bridge. Behind the shacks, 
sunken in a mud field, were the zinc-roofed cement structures of two 
brothels and a dance hall. This shanty town had emerged almost 
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overnight in 1978, when the company reopened its abandoned farms on 
the Costa Rican side of the border. Consequently, there was no 
provision for sewage or garbage disposal. Not surprisingly, alcoholism, 
venereal disease, petty crimes, and random violence abounded in this 
setting. (p. 5) 
Campesinos and Insecure Land Tenure 
Informants explained that insecure land tenure also leads rural 
inhabitants in the ACLAC to cut trees. In particular, “precaristas” 
(squatters) cut trees hoping to be awarded title to a piece of land. 
Squatters typically invade more attractive land sites, such as areas 
close to roads. Cutting trees allows them to make some money 
quickly by selling the wood and also opens up areas for agriculture 
and cattle-raising, allowing squatters to argue to the government that 
they should be granted a title because they have “improved” the 
land. Of course, since these persons do not have title to the land in 
question, they are cutting the trees illegally.4 
One interviewee explained that squatting is a significant social 
problem in the ACLAC because the area was long characterized by a 
lack of regulation of land settlement. If someone lived on a piece of 
land and had developed it, by custom his ownership was respected. 
Thus, the attitude developed, still strong among squatters, that 
settlement on undeveloped land is acceptable. In many cases, the 
persons already living on such lands do not have legal title 
themselves, making them more vulnerable to ultimately losing their 
land to squatters. 
These conditions are actually national in scope and have been 
fostered by government policies. Beginning in the early 1900s, as the 
price of coffee fluctuated and the population grew, agricultural 
wages decreased and unemployment increased. One response of the 
Costa Rican government was to create homestead laws that used the 
public domain lands in rural areas as an escape valve. These laws 
apparently gave every citizen a right to claim public lands but made 
no sustained effort to keep track of land grants. Most settlers never 
bothered to petition under the laws for more secure ownership. The 
vast majority of settlers believed that the right to claim land in the 
public domain also entailed having full ownership of the land, at 
least when it came to lands they had developed. Also most settlers 
were ignorant of titling rules or, even when they knew about them, 
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found it inconvenient to travel to the capital of San José to carry out 
complicated procedures (Saenz & Knight, 1971, part II, pp. 6-8).5 
Exploiting the “Socolar” Loophole 
Driven by poverty, insecure land tenure, and other factors, 
campesinos in the ACLAC often clear trees by way of a process 
interviewees explained as “socolar.” They begin by grubbing out the 
“sotobosque,” or the shorter and less thick vegetation surrounding 
large trees that are attractive for logging. Subsequently, they often 
plant beans, banana, and plantains or graze cattle within the space 
that has been opened. 
Once a forest has been transformed into “arboles en potrero” 
(trees in pasture) or an agroforestry area, if one has title to the land in 
question then clear-cutting is legal under the Forest Law of 1996. As 
explained earlier, this law prohibits clearing areas within forests. 
However, because its definition of forests is highly complicated and 
subjective, it is comparatively easy to convince forest regents and 
ACLAC officials that an area is not a forest. In such an area, only a 
forest inventory is necessary, the degree of logging is left more to the 
discretion of the forest regent and government officials, and clear-
cutting is possible. This situation has likely contributed to the fact 
that, in both 2001 and 2002, a larger portion of the wood extracted in 
Costa Rica derived from agricultural and ranching lands than from 
forests (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2002, p. 213; Proyecto Estado 
de la Nación, 2003, p. 242). 
According to one informant, peasants are generally aware that 
eliminating the sotobosque may lead in turn to permission to log 
more extensively. However, another interviewee did not attribute 
such foresightedness to the peasants; rather they clear out the 
underbrush primarily to enable agroforestry and ranching. 
Because clearing out sotobosque can lead to heavier logging, 
obstructing a major goal of the Forest Law of 1996, government 
officials have attempted to check this activity. Campesinos have 
responded by using various tactics to avoid detection. Interviewees 
explained that a common ploy is to clear away the vegetation 
surrounding trees during holidays and weekends when there are 
fewer enforcement officials on patrol.6 The informants also agreed 
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that a major barrier to better control to this activity is that SINAC 
has insufficient officials, vehicles, and funds. 
The Role of “Madereros” and Forest Regents 
Madereros are small logging and wood transporting companies, 
typically only owning one or two trucks and a tractor. As a result of 
the process described above, often when “madereros” (loggers) 
approach campesinos and offer to cut their trees, the land in question 
already includes pasture or agroforestry areas where logging can take 
place with only a forest inventory and where clear-cutting might be 
possible. However, one interviewee claimed that these loggers 
sometimes press campesinos to clear more sotobosque and also 
pressure landowners to allow more logging than they desire. While a 
landowner with 200 hectares of land might have hoped to log on 
only 80 hectares, the maderero might refuse to buy the landowner’s 
trees unless he permits logging on the entire 200 hectares. 
Furthermore, madereros often underpay peasants for their wood. The 
advantage to the maderero is obvious: logging more extensively in 
fewer locations lowers their expenses, and paying less for wood 
increases their profit. 
Lowering the leverage of peasants in such situations is the fact 
that they often do not have the necessary equipment or time to cut 
their trees and take them to market and that they can seldom “shop” 
for more favorable terms with other madereros. Thus, peasant 
families have little choice but to give in to such offers. 
Interviewees agreed that madereros have taken advantage of the 
campesinos’ economic need in the ACLAC to clear trees, reinforced 
by insecure land tenure. Making the maderero’s offer very attractive 
is the fact that, in addition to buying the wood they will extract, they 
are also typically willing to pay for all the necessary bureaucratic 
licenses. For instance, the maderero will likely offer to pay for the 
development of a management plan or forest inventory by a forest 
regent and for the campesino’s land title. Once again, this situation 
works to the advantage of the maderero in pressuring forest regents 
to allow heavier logging. First, madereros can argue that they are 
paying for the forest regent’s services and that the forestry engineer 
should therefore accommodate their requests. Second, madereros can 
threaten to switch to the services of a more cooperative forest regent. 
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In 2002 there were 482 licensed forest regents in Costa Rica 
(Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003, p. 244). Naturally, madereros 
usually continue a relationship with more accommodating regents. 
Third, madereros sometimes bribe forest regents in exchange for 
having them identify areas targeted for logging as pasture or 
agroforestry. However, because of the elimination of sotobosque, the 
targeted area has already been converted into pasture or agroforestry. 
In any case, once an area has been determined to not be a forest 
according to the law, madereros have then pressured forest regents to 
allow heavy logging following the development of a forest 
inventory. One interviewee contended that, although forest regents 
only rarely allow clear-cutting under such circumstances, they do 
commonly allow for more than 60 percent of trees to be eliminated. 
In addition to improperly classifying target areas as non-forest, 
forestry engineers and madereros have engaged in other illegal 
activities. For example, an interviewee explained that sometimes 
forest regents design logging permits that misidentify tree species 
(thus allowing protected species to be cut) and that mislocate trees 
(thus allowing trees in off-limit areas, such as river banks, to be 
logged). Additionally, sometimes madereros violate legally sound 
logging permits. One interviewee explained that a maderero holding 
a valid permit will also log beyond its geographic limits, log too 
close to a river, or cut more trees than the permit allows. One 
informant emphasized, however, that such permit violations are 
uncommon.7 
Whatever their relative importance, these various forms of 
illegal logging together account for a substantial amount of the total 
logging in the ACLAC. In a recent study, researchers at the Centro 
Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE) 
(Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center) found 
that in the ACLAC, as well as in the Área  de Conservación 
Tortuguero (ACTO) (Tortuguero Conservation Area) to the north, 
illegal logging accounted for about 37% of all logging--the highest 
rate among all the conservation areas studied (CATIE, 2001, p. 26). 
Corruption, Lack of Resources, and Other Barriers 
The clearing of sotobosque, classifying lands that are clearly 
covered in forest as pasture or agroforestry areas, other forms of 
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illegal activity, and heavy legal logging under forest inventories have 
all taken place during the watch of MINAE, specifically its officials 
at the regional and sub-regional offices of the ACLAC. These 
officials are responsible both for approving or denying the permitting 
decisions of forest regents and for helping these forestry 
professionals monitor the subsequent logging. 
The interviewees indicate that corruption is one factor leading 
these enforcement officials to allow a greater degree of logging. A 
common form of corruption is an official in the ACLAC who 
approves an inadequate forest inventory or approves management 
plans that allow illegal logging. Interviewees explained that, while 
sometimes public functionaries are bribed (with the compensation 
usually coming from madereros), friendship networks are also very 
important in facilitating corruption. According to one interviewee, a 
strong compadre relationship may develop between ACLAC 
functionaries, forest regents, and persons working for maderero 
companies, who are all active in the same geographic area. These 
individuals interact closely and frequently and have sometimes 
known one another since school days and may socialize (“sometimes 
close enough to go out together for drinks”). As another source of 
corruption, one interviewee asserted that deputies in Costa Rica’s 
Legislative Assembly supportive of madereros have pressured 
leaders at MINAE to reduce enforcement efforts in the field. 
Several other factors help explain why officials in the ACLAC 
have allowed so much logging in recent years. One informant 
emphasized that many MINAE employees have a “forestry 
mentality,” as they have an employment or educational background 
in this field. Another informant explained that, because the Forest 
Law of 1996 grants authority to forest regents to design logging 
permits, SINAC functionaries do not always do field inspections of 
planned logging sites. Finally, ACLAC regional and sub-regional 
offices have insufficient funds, employees, and equipment. One 
informant stated that a sub-regional office might be responsible for 
many remote logging sites spread out across a large area. And 
controlling logging is just one of the many responsibilities of such 
government officials. 
Carlos Rodríguez, Minister of MINAE, agreed that the most 
important cause of illegal logging in Costa Rica is weak enforcement 
capacity. He emphasized that corruption occurs only “here and 
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there” within MINAE, ironically because its enforcement ability is 
so weak that it is not necessary to bribe its officials. Rodríguez 
added, “We have one of the least trained, least prepared enforcement 
units you could ever find in any country” (C. Rodríguez, personal 
interview, May 19, 2002). Similarly, the director of the Área  de 
Conservación Arenal-Huetar Norte (ACA-HN) (Arenal-Huetar Norte 
Conservation Area) located in the Northern Zone identified 
insufficient enforcement capacity as the primary reason for illegal 
logging in that conservation area. He complained of insufficient 
enforcement personnel, especially at night and during holidays when 
such crimes are usually committed (Quesada, 2002, p. 4). In the Área  
de Conservación Osa (ACOSA) (Osa Conservation Area), the 
problem is similar: “There are only twenty vehicles, but only ten of 
them work; there is not enough gasoline, or personnel” (Calderón, 
2001, p. 8A). 
According to researchers at Costa Rica’s Proyecto Estado de la 
Nación (State of the Nation Project), the most important obstacle to 
SINAC’s functioning in general is its insufficient budget. 
Compounding this agency’s financial strain is the fact that funds 
must be diverted to pay persons whose land was appropriated to 
become part of protected areas. When it comes to national parks, 
biological reserves and national monuments, the government owes 
these landowners approximately US$55 million (Proyecto Estado de 
la Nación, 2004, pp. 251-252). According to the Forest Law of 1996, 
some of the revenues from a tax on wood sales are supposed to be 
devoted to enforcement, but apparently this tax has not been 
collected because of vague provisions in the law (Murillo, 1999, p. 
4A). Further still, the secretary general of the Workers Union at 
MINAE claimed that, not only has the budget for SINAC been 
decreasing, but also most of the funds provided to this system have 
gone toward administrative expenses, leaving only 40% of the 
budget for enforcement (Martínez, 1999, p. 4A). 
Problems within SINAC itself might also be responsible for 
fewer resources being devoted to enforcement. A study by the 
Contraloría General de la República (Comptroller General of the 
Republic) of financial management within SINAC in 1999 and 2000 
revealed important deficiencies, most notably inadequate data 
management and coordination between the multiple components of 
this large bureaucracy (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003, p. 228). 
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Problems during Transporting and Processing 
Government officials have also had a difficult time controlling 
the transport of illegally logged wood. Informants said that wood 
from the ACLAC is transported to towns within the region, such as 
Limón, Siquirres, Cahuita and Puerto Viejo, as well as to San José. 
Madereros often transport illegal wood at night, on weekends, or 
during holidays when there are fewer police on the roads. MINAE 
banned the transport of wood during the night (Herrera, 2002, 4A), 
but an informant contended that this rule was not being well 
implemented because many police officers were not aware of it.8 
Additionally, corruption sometimes plays a role. For instance, an 
interviewee explained that madereros pay police at checkpoints to 
allow the passage of wood not accompanied by a proper manifest. 
Another informant asserted that madereros use “recycled” manifests 
that apply to wood moved in the past. For this strategy, the manifest 
cannot have been stamped at police checkpoints. Thus, the maderero 
must transport wood at night when checkpoints are not operating, 
bribe the police, or simply be on friendly terms with police officers. 
Further still, it was explained that in some cases SINAC officials 
have provided extra manifests to madereros. 
According to interviewees, wood extracted from the ACLAC is 
mostly sold to sawmills, depositories, and furniture manufacturers. 
Madereros are in a much less advantageous position with these 
processors and depositories than they are with campesinos, regents, 
and sometimes government officials. Madereros seek to sell their 
wood as quickly as possible because they need to empty their one or 
two trucks so they can return to the forests and pick up more wood. 
As a result, madereros may feel compelled to accept lower prices 
offered by processors. Wood industries are also empowered when 
madereros attempt to sell illegal wood. Processors often demand a 
lower price because of the risk involved in using such wood. 
Impunity: An Overarching Problem 
Finally, interviewees agreed that all of those complicit in illegal 
logging, transport, and processing have been emboldened by the lack 
of enforcement. First, court proceedings are long and expensive, 
discouraging the government from prosecuting. Second, they 
reported that landowners can avoid guilt by claiming ignorance of a 
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maderero’s illegal acts. The maderero can in turn argue the same 
regarding a contracted logger, and this sequence continues until the 
prosecution gives up, especially when someone who is named cannot 
be found or who is believed to have moved to another country. 
Third, the penalties in the Forest Law of 1996 are weak. Fourth, 
many judges are not very environmentally conscious. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that around 95% of accusations about violations of the 
Forest Law of 1996 are unsuccessful (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 
2003, p. 244). 
ADDRESSING STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND THE 
PROMISE OF MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES 
In sum, the key causes of deforestation and heavy logging in the 
ACLAC are poverty among campesinos, their insecure land tenure, 
corruption among government officials and forest regents, lack of 
sufficient enforcement funds, loopholes in the Forest Law of 1996, 
and ineffective judicial procedures. One general conclusion is that 
the primary engines of deforestation in Costa Rica appear to have 
evolved over time. 
To be sure, certain causes appear well-entrenched. Brockett and 
Gottfried studied the command and control methods utilized to 
protect forests in Costa Rica in the 1970s and ’80s and found that 
field personnel lacked the resources and knowledge to carry out 
effective enforcement. Furthermore, one of their informants 
commented that most landowners did not want to deal with the 
Dirección General Forestal (DGF) (General Forestry Directorate) 
(later incorporated into SINAC) because of excessive bureaucracy 
and corruption. Another informant complained that DGF field 
personnel were not dedicated to that agency’s mission; low salaries, 
among other problems, encouraged corruption, which was as much a 
cause of illegal logging as the actions of landowners and loggers 
(Brockett & Gottfried, 2002, pp. 17-18). Also mirroring the findings 
documented in this chapter, Brockett and Gottfried (2002) found: 
The difficulty of obtaining plans and permits has led landholders to 
rely often on loggers, who frequently have drawn up fraudulent 
management plans or bribed officials to obtain permits. The loggers set 
the terms of the contract, paying a low price to owners, and only for the 
wood they actually put on their truck (usually much less than what was 
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cut). The loggers extract only the best wood, “high-grading” the stands, 
and they often leave a heavily damaged forest behind. (p. 18) 
However, the role of logging vis-à-vis agriculture appears to 
have increased over time. In contrast to this chapter’s finding that, in 
the ACLAC, since the late 1990s logging has been of central 
importance to deforestation and other degradation of forests, 
Brockett and Gottfried concluded that in Costa Rica deforestation 
has clearly been driven by the demand for more agricultural land 
rather than a demand for timber. Until the 1980s, most forests were 
cleared for ranching, which requires large tracts of land. 
Subsequently, as ranching began to pose less of a threat to forests, 
pressure from banana cultivation increased (Brockett & Gottfried, 
2002, p. 16).9 Furthermore, campesinos now seem to play a more 
important role in deforestation. According to one study in the 1980s, 
campesinos cutting trees to meet basic needs were much less 
significant than larger-scale business interests engaged in ranching, 
coffee production, and wood extraction (Porras & Villarreal, 1986, 
pp. 12-13). 
Another general conclusion emerging from this analysis is that, 
in order to more effectively carry out the Forest Law of 1996, it will 
be necessary to tackle structural problems. Poverty, insecure land 
tenure, corruption, lack of sufficient funds, legal loopholes, and 
ineffective judicial procedures have led to heavy and sometimes 
illegal logging in the ACLAC. While the Forest Law of 1996 might 
be changed relatively quickly, the other problems are deeply 
ingrained and can be significantly reduced only over the longer term. 
Considering these very formidable barriers to improved 
execution in the ACLAC of restrictions in the Forest Law of 1996, 
perhaps holding more promise in the short to medium term for 
controlling forest loss is a market-based approach rather than a 
command and control one. In the Forest Law of 1996 itself, the 
“pago de servicios ambientales” (payment for environmental 
services) (PSA) offers economic incentives for forest conservation, 
sustainable logging and reforestation. More specifically, the PSA 
program compensates the owners of forests who protect them or 
“manage” them (by logging them in a sustainable manner), and 
compensates the owners of forest plantations. This compensation is 
payment for their performing the “environmental services” of 
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sequestering greenhouse gas and harboring biodiversity (Asamblea 
Legislativa, 1996). 
There is, in fact, strong evidence that this incentive scheme is 
useful in slowing forest loss. Between 1997 and 2001, this program 
provided financing to 4,461 persons, amounting to coverage of 
284,430 hectares (MINAE & PNUMA, 2002, p. 137). Awardees 
were larger as well as smaller landholders, some involved in logging 
and others simply preserving their forests. In reference to recent 
forest cover studies indicating that net forest loss has finally stopped in 
Costa Rica, government officials argued that this incentive scheme has 
played a central role by encouraging increased preservation of forests 
as well as reforestation on private lands (Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal [FONAFIFO], 2002, p. 16). 
Carlos Rodríguez of MINAE and environmental movement 
leader Alvaro Ugalde agreed. They contended that, although 
deforestation continues in Costa Rica, the annual rate has been 
decreasing in recent years, and this economic incentive has 
encouraged more people to maintain rather than to destroy their 
forests (C. Rodríguez, personal interview, May 16, 2002; A. Ugalde, 
personal interview, April 19, 2002). Illustrating how the PSA has 
reached the rural poor, between 1997 and 2001 indigenous 
communities received more than 221 million Costa Rican colones 
through this scheme (FONAFIFO, 2002, p. 74). According to the 
exchange rate of 360 colones per U.S. dollar, which was the case 
approximately midway through the following year of 2002, this 
amounted to roughly US$614,000. In some cases, this financial 
assistance was crucial for families in these communities, as it was 
their primary source of income (FONAFIFO, 2002, p. 23). 
Thus, while the structural barriers to improved regulation of 
forestry in the ACLAC might only be surmounted in the longer term, 
in the meantime, a useful way of suppressing forest loss would be to 
boost application of the PSA in that region. Paying campesinos to 
preserve the forest or to log in a sustainable manner helps to stop at 
its source the chain of events described earlier. At the same time, this 
market-based approach still encourages the development of the 
forestry sector, which has important values of its own.10 
Costa Rica has provided a model for the rest of the developing 
world on how to successfully develop parks and other protected 
areas. Similarly, the strategy just outlined might provide a useful 
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model for other developing countries on how to better control forest 
loss on private lands. Indeed, the causes of forest loss vary widely 
across space and time. For instance, while logging operations have 
played a major role in deforestation in Southeast Asia and West 
Africa, they have recently played a minor part in Latin America, 
where an expansion in cattle ranching explains much of the recent 
increase in deforestation (Rudel & Horowitz, 1993, p. 2). 
There is still much in common, though, between the causes of 
deforestation in the ACLAC and those elsewhere in the developing 
world. Peasants have cleared large amounts of forest in Latin 
America as well as Asia and Africa, and poverty has been a key 
motive (Dudley, Guilmour, & Jeanrenaud, 1996, p. 11; Rudel & 
Horowitz, 1993, p. 2). In particular, in recent decades the landless 
poor have increased dramatically in tropical countries, leading to 
increased colonization of forested areas (Johnson & Cabarle, 1995, 
p. 9). In the Peruvian Amazon, an average of 350,000 hectares of 
forest is cleared per year through shifting agriculture by migrants, 
who have come to the area primarily to escape impoverishment in 
the Andean highlands (Bedoya Garland, 1995, pp. 218-219, 222). 
Of course, it would be difficult to follow the strategy recommended 
for Costa Rica in other developing countries. In addition to the 
difficulty of carrying out major reforms aimed at reducing poverty and 
addressing other structural problems, implementing a PSA-like 
program would probably prove challenging. As Brockett and 
Gottfried (2002) explained, “Market alternatives traditionally have 
been denigrated in Latin America, not only because of the 
underdevelopment of markets and the region’s statist heritage, but 
because of a generalized distrust of capitalism” (Brocket & 
Gottfried, 2002, p. 22). 
NOTES 
1. The two largest indigenous groups in the region, the Bribri 
and Cabécar, are described as practicing agriculture that is itinerant 
and allowing cultivated areas to lay fallow, as well as carrying out 
small-scale cattle grazing, hunting, fishing, and gathering (Borge & 
Villalobos, 1994, p. 16). 
2. Following this outbreak of the monilia fungus, cacao has only 
been cultivated to a limited extent, such as organic production on a 
small scale in Limón Province’s cantones (counties) of Limón and 
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Talamanca (Junta de Administración Portuaria y de Desarrollo 
Económico de la Vertiente Atlántica [JAPDEVA], 2000, p. 77). The 
ACLAC accounts for a large part of the province of Limón, which is 
one of several provinces into which Costa Rica is divided. 
3. In 1997, the unemployment rate in the province of Limón was 
higher than the national average (7.2% in comparison to 5.8%) 
(JAPDEVA, 2000, p. 71). 
4. According to the Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (IDA) 
(Agrarian Development Institute), in the Caribbean region 42 squatter 
groups recently invaded 8,869 hectares. There were 26 landless groups 
with the potential to settle an estimated 5,041 hectares (JAPDEVA, 
2000, p. 87). 
5. According to one inhabitant of coastal Talamanca, Alphaeus 
Buchanan, members of his community could not afford the services 
of lawyer to obtain a title. Furthermore, in the past, lawyers had 
convinced community members who were unable to read Spanish to 
sign documents in that language that caused them to lose their 
property (Palmer, 1994, p. 310). 
6. Peasants often begin these activities farthest from roads and 
paths where patrolling takes place. Landowners also avoid using 
loud machinery. Furthermore, the vegetation surrounding trees is 
commonly cut very slowly, and clippings are cut into small pieces so 
that they will decay more quickly in the humid climate. In order to 
make clippings disappear faster, sometimes they are burned or 
covered with a poison. Additionally, poison is placed directly on 
larger trees in an effort to dry out their canopies, which will allow 
more light to pass through. With increased light, lower vegetation 
adapted to shade slowly dies away. 
7. Finally, logging sometimes takes place without a management 
plan or forest inventory. The interview data point toward the 
conclusion that, for the most part, this type of illegal logging is 
carried out by campesinos felling a small number of trees. Peasants 
cut trees without a management plan or forest inventory because 
they are not aware of this requirement or because they are not able to 
obtain the necessary land title and cannot find a maderero willing to 
log without a management plan or inventory. 
8. Additionally, illicit wood is moved in banana trucks with a 
layer of bananas on top, is covered with a concealing layer of sand in 
dump trucks, or is hidden in enclosed trucks. One informant only 
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partly in jest suggested that illegal wood might be hidden in a truck 
labeled “Galletas Pozuelo,” which is a popular cookie. Furthermore, 
wood types that are not authorized in the manifest are often included 
on logging trucks, but many police are not able to distinguish among 
different types of wood. 
9. In Central America as a whole, the cattle sector has been in a 
crisis since the early 1980s. Edelman (1995) explains the relative 
decline in the importance of ranching for deforestation comes as a 
result not just of decreased demand for beef in the United States, but 
also because of many other factors originating both in the United 
States and Central America. For instance, in the late 1970s the U.S. 
government discouraged beef imports by decreasing import quotas 
during expansive phases of the U.S. cattle cycle. Also burdening 
beef producers in Costa Rica was unprecedented inflation in the 
early 1980s that led to a steep rise in interest rates (pp. 27, 29, 31). 
10. According to recent assessments, in Costa Rica there are 
7,280 businesses directly or indirectly linked to the forestry sector, 
entailing 48,000 jobs (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2004, pp. 271-
272). This sector also contributes approximately 5% of the gross 
domestic product (Proyecto Estado de la Nación, 2003, p. 241). 
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ACRONYMS 
ACA-HN Área  de Conservación Arenal-Huetar Norte (Arenal- 
Huetar Norte Conservation Area) 
ACLAC Área  de Conservación La Amistad-Caribe (Amistad-
Caribe Conservation Area) 
ACOSA Área  de Conservación Osa (Osa Conservation Area)s 
ACTO Área  de Conservación Tortuguero (Tortuguero Cons-
ervation Area) 
CATIE Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y En-
señanza (Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher 
Education Center) 
CCT Centro Científico Tropical (Tropical Science Center) 
DGF Dirección General Forestal (General Forestry Directorate) 
IDA Instituto de Desarrollo Agrario (Agrarian Development 
Institute) 
MINAE Ministerio de Ambiente y Energía (Ministry of 
Environment and Energy) 
PSA pago de servicios ambientales (payment for environ-
mental services) 
SINAC Sistema Nacional de Áreas de Conservación (National 
System of Conservation Areas) 
 
 
